![]() Thorsen contends that this was material misrepresentation because no school board vote had happened yet. Then, through his union representative, the District informed him that he would need to resign before leaving the fact-finding meeting to avoid being fired. He alleges that the District informed him that “his firing/termination for alleged just cause was imminent.” Id. Still, he notes that 3 the District took issue with his use of the phrase “bless you my child.” At some point after he allegedly made some students uncomfortable with his talk of Christianity, he participated in a “fact-finding meeting” in which he was informed of this. Thorsen’s complaint paints a picture of a tenured history teacher with a history of high performance marks and positive student reviews. The factual allegations supporting this assertion are sparse. He also claimed that between April and the end of August of 2019, the working conditions were intolerable. Though Thorsen began teaching in the District in August 1996, he alleges that the discrimination began in April 2019. He claims that the District discriminated against him by forcing him to resign after the District told him that some students were uncomfortable with his “talk of Christianity and religion” in the classroom. Religious Discrimination Thorsen sues the District for religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, even claims that are improbable should not be dismissed at the pleading stage. But, at the motion to dismiss stage, Thorsen need only allege facts sufficient to raise the plausible inference that the District is liable, he does not have to prove anything yet. Indeed, the District mostly cites to cases decided on summary judgment, not on a motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the District seems to argue (several times) that Thorsen must prove facts. The Court accepts as true all of Thorsen’s wellpleaded allegations and the reasonable inferences that arise from those allegations in Thorsen’s favor. 2010) (court does not stack inferences side-by-side only allowing a case to proceed if plaintiff’s 2 inferences are more compelling). If that is what the District truly intends to argue, it is fundamentally wrong. 43, at 1 (referring to “he more reasonable inference”). At multiple times, the District’s briefing argues that this Court should weigh the complaint’s inferences that are favorable to it against the complaint’s inferences that favor Thorsen. Critically, federal courts accept as true all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Unlike the “no set of facts” standard, the plausibility pleading standard-which allegedly is still notice pleading-means that a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. Now, to defeat a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must have alleged facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. But those cases represented a major shift. Legal Standard Before the landmark cases of Twombly and Iqbal, federal courts asked whether there was “no set of facts” under which the plaintiff would be entitled to relief from the defendant. Because Thorsen has pleaded an adverse employment action, albeit barely, but has 1 abandoned his breach of contract claim, the motion is denied in part and granted in part. In response, the District filed a motion to dismiss. Thorsen sued under Title VII, claiming religious discrimination and for breach of contract. If the termination was voluntary, then Thorsen has no claim. If the termination was involuntary, then an adverse employment action occurred. The question is whether the termination was voluntary. There is no question that Thorsen’s employment with the District was terminated. The more precise issue is whether the amended complaint pleads an adverse employment action. The general issue is whether Thorsen’s amended complaint pleads a claim under Title VII. Thorsen contends that the District discriminated against him because of his Christian faith. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Pierre Thorsen was a high school history teacher employed by the Defendant, Community Unit School District 300 (“the District”), between August 1996 and August 2019. Johnston Community Unit School District 300 Defendant. 46 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS WESTERN DIVISION Pierre Thorsen, Plaintiff, Case No.
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